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FOREWORD: H UMAN RIGHTS , THE RULE OF LAW, AND NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Gary L. McDowell∗ & Stephen B. Presser∗∗
¶ 1 On

July 23, 2000, in London, England, we were the convenors of a conference
jointly sponsored by the University of London’s Institutes of Advanced Legal Studies,
Historical Research, and United States Studies and Northwestern University School of
Law, made possible by a grant from the Searle Fund. 1 The title of the conference was At
Century's Dawn: The future and past of human rights and the rule of law. Five principal
papers were presented at that conference, and now appear as articles in this volume of
Northwestern University’s Journal of International Human Rights.
¶ 2 The five papers explored different aspects of the conference’s principal theme,
whether “human rights,” as then generally understood, were consistent with the basis of
the Anglo-American jurisprudential system, the rule of law. 2 The conference had been
convened following NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, the first time that organization
had used armed force against a U.N. member state without the express authorization of
the United Nations Security Council. That intervention was undertaken ostensibly to
protect the “human rights” of Balkan minority groups, although it appeared to be in
tension with the United Nation’s Charter’s guarantee of and protection for national
sovereignty.
¶ 3 Since

the conference, of course, the events of September 11, 2001, resulting in
the death and destruction from terrorist acts of several thousand persons in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. led to the current “war on terror,” waged through
military campaigns by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. All of
these activities have led to an increased awareness of human rights issues, as this country
seeks to balance its need for security against individual freedoms. All five of the papers
presented here do not expressly address issues involved in that balance, but insofar as
each of them clarifies what is meant by “human rights,” and insofar as each of them does
seek to understand how nations and the world can further “human rights” while
∗
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We gratefully acknowledge the generosity of the Searle Fund board, and in particular Dan Searle, Gideon
Searle , Henry Bienen, and David Van Zandt, in sponsoring the conference and in underwriting the
publication of this volume. Dean Van Zandt, in particular, was with us in London, and gave an opening
speech at the conference. We are also very grateful to the editors of the Northwestern University Journal of
International Human Rights for offering us this forum for publication and for splendidly editing the
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2
As Professor Sir John Baker reminds us in a footnote to his paper in this volume: “[t]he two are linked in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Sir John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in
Renaissance
England,
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at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/3 (2004). (citing Universal Declaration of Human
Rights G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948): “It is essential . . . that human rights should be
protected by the rule of law.”)).
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simultaneously maintaining national sovereignty and the rule of law, they are
indispensable reading of great contemporary relevance.
¶ 4 In the first of these papers, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and
Persistence, Professor Brian Tierney furnishes a working definition, “[n]atural rights or
human rights are rights that inhere in persons by reason of their very humanity.”3 Tierney
seeks to address the question whether “our modern culture of rights [is] a Western
peculiarity with no resonance for the rest of humanity.”4 Tierney concludes that in its
early stages our current concept of “human rights,” was in fact a Western creation, and
that “jurists of the twelfth century, especially the church lawyers, played an important
innovatory role.”5 Tierney demonstrates how, as a result of what he calls “juristic
semantics,” “the little phrase ius naturale shifted from an objective to a subjective
meaning, [and] an ancient concept of natural law was reshaped into a modern idea of
natural rights.”6 Tierney’s “church lawyers,” were struggling to define a means of
protecting the church against the increasing assertiveness of Kings and Lords, and out of
their efforts, carried on pursuant to a “great revival of legal studies,” and a recovery of
the jurisprudence of antiquity, came the basis for our modern conception of rights that
protect individuals against the assertion of the arbitrary power of governments.

Professor Tierney also reminds us that it may sometimes be too facile to see an
opposition between the assertion of individual rights and the continuing needs of the
community in the maintenance of the rule of law. He reminds us that among the purposes
of jurisprudence, after all, is to secure the rights of individuals, and that his twelfth
century churchmen “could have agreed with a modern philosopher, Jacques Maritain,
when he wrote that ‘there is nothing more illusory than to pose the problem of the person
and the common good in terms of opposition.’”7
¶5

¶ 6 Professor Sir John Baker, in Human Rights and the Rule of Law in
Renaissance England, further develops this theme of the symbiotic relationship between
the rule of law and human rights by reminding us that the most important “human right”
is the rule of law itself. As do the papers of Professors Glendon and Cassel, Professor
Baker reminds us that we have not (and perhaps never will) arrive at a situation where
our governments or our supra-national organizations fully secure “universal human
rights,” especially when we are threatened by “hidden enemies.” But Baker nicely
asserts that the fact that the security measures that appear to infringe these “rights,” are
“controversial nevertheless shows that the old philosophy of the rule of law is not
moribund; indeed, it still applies in most everyday situations and is regarded as the
ideal.”8

3

Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and Persistence, 2 NW . U. J. INT ’L HUM. RT S. 2, fn.2,
at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/2 (2004).
4
Id. at ¶ 1.
5
Id. at ¶ 5.
6
Id.
7
Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting JACQUES M ARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 67 (1966)).
8
Baker, supra note 2, at ¶ 1.
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¶ 7 Professor Baker, in a manner similar to that of Professor Tierney, then
proceeds to explore “the hypothesis that these ‘human’ rights are not such a new
departure as is fashionably supposed, but rather an attempt to restate and refine
assumptions which have long been present in the [English] common law.”9 He reminds
us that in the seventeenth century great champions of the common law like Sir Edward
Coke and his colleagues in the House of Commons began “collectively to assert the
‘rights’ of the people,” in order to counter the threat of Stuart absolutism. 10 Moreover,
Baker explains that “these ancient rights of which parliamentarians spoke were not
universal “human” rights or rights derived from some abstract regime superior to
municipal law,” but instead were “the rights and liberties of Englishmen, inherited by
birth like other forms of franchise or property, guaranteed over the centuries by charters
of liberties and statutes of due process, and believed to be superior to such rights as might
belong to the peoples of benighted nations.”11
¶ 8 Baker thus elaborates a particularly English strain of “human rights law,” and
shows the flourishing of this strain in a time, the early English Renaissance, commonly
thought to be characterized by the arbitrary rule of Henry VIII. Though Baker quite
nicely stresses the unique features of the English experience, again, as did Tierney, he
does help us understand that:

[t]here are two basic features of human rights law for which
comparisons might be sought in an earlier age. First, there is the
substantive content of the corpus of rights as now understood, in
the sense of the broad moral or legal assumptions which they
represent. Second, and more fundamental from the lawyer’s point
of view, there is the notion that some of those rights are (or ought
to be) so fundamental that they are somehow entrenched against
legislative interference. 12
¶ 9 These two features, Baker reminds us, “represent some kind of higher law,
antecedent morally—if not historically—to man- made law,” and further that “[a]
precondition for both of these notions is the existence of a political constitution which
embodies or recognises what is commonly labeled the Rule of Law —meaning, in broad
terms, that rulers are obliged to govern according to known principles of law and not in a
despotic or arbitrary manner.”13 In the rest of his paper Professor Baker shows
convincingly that “[t]here is a case for saying that none of these three phenomena [a
corpus of substantive rights, the entrenchment of those rights against legislative
interference, and the maintenance of the rule of law to secure those rights] were alien to
English law in the Renaissance period.”14

9

Id.
Id. at ¶ 2.
11
Id. at ¶ 3.
12
Id. at ¶ 4.
13
Id.
14
Id.
10
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¶ 10 In his paper, Natural Rights and Modern Constitutionalism, Professor
Michael Zuckert continues the essentially chronological treatment of this volume by
moving to the framing of the United States Constitution, and explaining how the
American framers conceived of a means to maintain the rule of law not through the
balancing of orders in society, as did the English, but rather through the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers. As does Baker, Zuckert explores the
interconnection of concepts of rights and the rule of law, and in the course of this
explanation, he makes “three contributions to the understanding of modern
constitutionalism.”15 These are (1) “to contest the view that Montesquieu was not a
natural rights thinker,” (2) to show that Montesquieu’s “version of natural rights
decisively shaped his constitutional theory,” and (3) to show “how the American
constitution came to contain judicial review as a result of the particular way in which the
American founders attempted to adapt Montesquieuan constitutional theory to their own
circumstances.”16

Zuckert’s study of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu leads him to examine
two “central dimensions of modern constitutionalism,” derived “from the Lockean
natural rights orientation: governments have a definite and limited teleology, to secure
rights; they have a limited and precise object. Moreover, governments are not to be
exempt from controls and limitations; the controller must also be controlled.”17 Thus
Zuckert, as do other contributors here, links human rights (here “Lockean natural rights”)
with the rule of law’s limitations on arbitrary governmental acts. Zuckert shows how
Montesquieu thought these two aspects of modern constitutionalism could be best
secured by a complex combination of “separated powers, checks and balances, and mixed
government.”18 He then proceeds elegantly to show how Madison and the Constitution’s
framers adopted this understanding of Montesquieu’s to the constitutional needs of an
American people unwilling to permit a mixed government containing a King and
hereditary aristocracy, with what seems like primary reliance on the new institution of
judicial review to maintain separation of powers and checks and balances.
¶ 11

In the course of his exposition, Zuckert explains why the Court has always
been a source of controversy at the same time it has effectively preserved “modern
constitutionalism.”
For Zuckert, “[t]here is a built- in disproportion between the
[Supreme Court’s] political tasks and the legal tools with which these are supposed to be
accomplished.”19 It can try, as courts have historically done, to decide issues on a
narrowly legal basis, “following the rule of the ‘clear mistake’ or applying a strictly
originalist approach to cases,” but it must also attempt “to fulfill the broader, political,
trans- legal system needs thrown into its lap” by the Constitutional scheme of separation
of powers and checks and balances. 20 As Zuckert observes, “[r]esponding to that
¶ 12

15

Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and Modern Constitutionalism, 2 NW . U. J. INT ’L HUM. RTS. 4, ¶ 1, at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/4 (2004).
16
Id.
17
Id. at ¶ 19.
18
Id. at ¶ 31.
19
Id. at ¶ 78.
20
Id.
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dilemma, the Court is constantly driven beyond the bounds of strict lega lity in order to do
its political work, and thus opens itself at frequent intervals to the charge that it has (once
again) gotten too big for its admittedly capacious britches.”21
Perhaps in the tension that Zuckert discovers between the Court’s political
and legal roles is seen something of an eternal conflict between the assertion of individual
human rights and the maintenance of the institutions devoted to the rule of law which
enforce them. In his close analysis of Madison and Montesquieu’s tho ught, Zuckert
examines this tension at the level of national constitutional government, while Professor
Mary Ann Glendon, in her piece, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, explores the problem in terms of international law.
¶ 13

¶ 14 Professor Glendon’s statement of these articles’ common theme is that “[i]t is
a commonplace that long lists of rights are empty words in the absence of a legal and
political order in which rights can be realized.”22 She proceeds to demonstrate how the
architects of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) sought to
balance their articulation of
internationally- valid basic human rights with the
maintenance of national and international institutions to secure those rights, including, for
example,

a right “to take part in the government of [one’s] country”; a right
to “a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be realized”; an
acknowledgment that everyone’s rights are limited by the need for
“meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society”; and an express
recognition of the importance of the rule of law. 23
Glendon praises the “political realism of the men and women who drafted the
Universal Declaration,” and indicates that many current human rights advocates may
have “forgotten or ignored” how attention to the rule of law and the institutions which
secure it are indispensable to the protection of human rights. 24 The aim of her essay, she
explains, is “to recall the history of the rule-of-law provisions of the UDHR with the hope
of shedding some light on current controversies over the respective roles of nation-states
and international bodies in bringing human rights to life.”25 Among the many virtues of
Glendon’s piece is her effort, through her reading and exposition of the UDHR, both to
make clear what are the modern relatively uncontroversial notions of human rights and
political participation, 26 as well to suggest those “rights” that still have not achieved full
¶ 15

21

Id.
Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 NW . U. J. INT ’L
HUM. RTS. 5, ¶ 1, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/5 (2004).
23
Id. (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, at Arts. 21, 28, 29, and prmbl. (3)).
24
Id. at ¶ 2.
25
Id.
26
E.g., “rights to life, liberty, and personal security; bans on slavery and torture; rights to legal recognition,
equality before the law, and effective remedies for violation of fundamental rights; freedom from arbitrary
arrest and detention; guarantees of fair criminal procedures, the presumption of innocence, and the
principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law” as well as “freedom of religion and belief; freedom of
22
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acceptance as basic human entitlements governments are instituted to supply. 27 Simply to
enumerate these “rights” of the UDHR is to demonstrate how some of them may actually
be in conflict—how, for example, does one easily reconcile the “right to nationality,”
with “freedom of movement and the right of return,” or “the right to seek and enjoy
political asylum?” More troubling, how do some of these more commonly accepted
rights, which seem to depend for their enforcement on the exercise of national
sovereignty and political participation of citizens easily co-exist with the Declaration’s
Article 28, “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”28
Professor Glendon very nicely exposes the difficulties that the securing of
these expansive rights pose for nations like ours, leery of central planning, and even
socialist nations reluctant to allow individuals the full panoply of private rights which the
UDHR seems to favor. Glendon appears to suggest that the means of reconciling these
conflicting needs and tensions, as the framers of the UDHR understood, is to guarantee
the rule of law and to adopt a somewhat Burkean tolerance for individual nations to
evolve indigenous structures and institutions for the gradual and eventual achievement of
many of these rights. For Glendon, then, and for the framers of the UDHR, the
articulation of human rights may be as much about aspirations, ideals, and gradual
evolution as they are about revolution or instant gratification. As Eleanor Roosevelt, one
of these distinguished framers, put it, the “[m]ethods for ensuring the realization of those
rights . . . would necessarily vary from one country to another and such variations
should be considered not only inevitable but salutary.’”29
¶ 16

¶ 17 If the recognition of the need for variations among nations (and, perhaps the
preservation of national character) was a crucial and fragile insight of the UDHR’s
framers, so, Professor Glendon rightly stresses, was their understanding set forth in
Article 29, of the inevitable linkage of individual duties with individual rights:

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free
and full development of his personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of

opinion, expression, and communication; freedom of assembly and association; and the ‘right to take part
in government . . . directly or through freely chosen representatives.’” Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12 (citing Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2).
27
Including, apparently, “the right to be free of arbitrary interference with one’s ‘privacy, family, home, or
correspondence’ and from arbitrary attacks upon one’s ‘honor and reputation’; freedom of movement and
the right of return; the right to seek and enjoy political asylum; the right to a nationality; the right to marry
and to found a family, the right of the family as such to ‘protection by society and the State,’ and the right
to own property,” as well as “rights to a minimum standard of living, to work, to social security in the
event of unemployment or disability, to form and join unions, and to education.” Id. at ¶ 11.
28
Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, at Art. 28).
29
Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Human Rights Commission, 3d Sess., at 5-6, E/CN.4/SR64 (1947)).
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morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 30
Clause (3) of Article 29 obviously raises some difficulties for national
sovereignty, since the U.N.’s charter never successfully resolves the conflict it creates
between the human rights and the national sovereignty which it seeks simultaneously to
guarantee. But one needs only to read the first two provisions of Article 29, and its
impressive understanding that personality needs community to develop, to realize the
poverty of conception and understanding of highly- individualistic pronouncements like
the infamous 1992 “mystery passage” of the United States Supreme Court, recently
invoked to find a right to engage in adult consensual homosexual conduct free from
criminal penalties. 31
¶ 18

¶ 19 Glendon closes her piece on a cautionary note, “[w]hat many of today’s
internationalists have forgotten, or chosen to ignore, is that [the framers of the UDHR]
saw the rule of law at the national level as the best and surest legal means for protecting
human rights.”32 For Glendon, then, national sovereignty and the rule of law are as
indispensable foundations for human rights, as are the international governmental
organizations such as the U.N., NATO, or NGO’s. Her caution nicely places in context
and perspective the concluding essay by Professor Douglass Cassel, who reviews the
work of these international organizations in his piece, The Globalization of Human
Rights: Consciousness, Law, and Reality.
¶ 20 Professor Cassel laments what he regards as “sharp setbacks” for human
rights in the four years since his paper was originally delivered, as a result of the war on
terrorism, but still finds reasons for “guarded optimism.” He describes “a revolution in
global human rights consciousness, law and institutions,” that has occurred over the last
half-century, the period that begins with the UDHR. 33 “Atrocities are still committed,” he
tells us, “but we now have international legal tools to address them—if we have the
will.”34 Cassel seeks to determine how this extraordinary change in the last five decades
has come to be, and, in particular how in “both a formal and a real sense, basic human

30

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, at Art. 29.
“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
found under the compulsion of the state.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter). The “mystery passage” was cited as
justification for the invalidation of criminal penalties for consensual adult homosexual acts in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the court in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct 2472, 2482, 539 U.S. 558, ___ (2003).
The “mystery passage” wrongly assumes that one defines one’s own concept of personhood and fails to
understand that meaning in life does not come from individual decision but from relationships with one’s
fellows in society. Conversely, Article 29 of the UDHR makes this clear.
32
Glendon, supra note 22, at ¶ 28.
33
Douglass Cassel, The Globalization of Human Rights: Consciousness, Law, and Reality, 2 NW . U. J.
INT ’L HUM. RTS. 6, ¶ 7, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/6 (2004).
34
Id.
31
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rights are no longer merely national, but global concerns.”35 While Professor Glendon
identified as a positive aspect of the UDHR that it stressed duties as well as rights,
Professor Cassel attributes much of the accelerated concern with human rights to a mindset that is less interested in community and more interested in individuality, albeit
devoted to the rule of law rather than “authoritarian compulsion.”36 Indeed, he concludes
that “[i]nternational law today formally recognizes almost all human rights, for almost all
persons, in almost all places.”37
Accompanying, and helping to foster this “rights consciousness,” Cassel
argues, is “a proliferation of global and regional institutions and mechanisms—reporting
requirements, monitoring devices, public hearings, special mediators, investigative
bodies, complaint procedures, international courts, admission requirements for
international organizations, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions,
and even occasional military intervention.”38 Still, Cassel warns that the “rights
revolution” has yet to “triumph on the ground,” as “the 1990’s saw massive ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, indiscriminate shelling of
civilians in Chechnya, unspeakable brutality in Sierra Leone, unchecked violence in
Colombia and the Congo, continued systemic violence against women in many countries,
and widespread poverty and growing economic inequality within and between nations.”39
¶ 21

¶ 22 Of particular interest in Professor Cassel’s analysis is the distinction he draws
between the United States and the United Kingdom. While Professors Baker and Zuckert
are able to discover important foundations for human rights and the rule of law in both
the English and American traditions, Cassel states that:

[w]ith respect to international human rights law, despite their
common rights traditions, the U.K. and U.S. are at radically
different stages of development. The U.K. is party in a meaningful
way to human rights treaties and courts. London yields to
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, even in
controversial cases of public interest. Britain is subject as well to
human rights rulings by the European Court of Justice. Although
among the last Council of Europe members to do so, Britain
recently made European human rights law enforceable in domestic
courts . . ..
The U.S., on the other hand, is not yet prepared to submit to international human rights
law. We refuse to join widely accepted treaties on rights of women and children, on antipersonnel land mines, on an International Criminal Court, and on economic and social
rights, as well as our regional human rights treaty. Although we have ratified treaties on
genocide, torture, race discrimination, and civil and political rights, we attached
debilitating reservations. These provisos conform the application of treaty norms in the

35

Id. at ¶ 139.
Id. at ¶ 9.
37
Id. at ¶ 15.
38
Id. at ¶ 16.
39
Id. at ¶ 18.
36
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U.S. to our national preferences. They also make the treaties largely unenforceable in our
domestic courts, while declining to accept even non-binding international complaint
procedures, let alone the jurisdiction of international courts. 40
Professor Cassel’s strong implication is that the United States would do well
to follow the example of the United Kingdom, and that this country ought better to
appreciate “the advantages of international law,” especially as “the rising future power of
Europe and Asia constrains American unilateralism . . ..”41 There is a very strong
idealistic and, indeed, religious dimension to Professor Cassel’s piece. He takes very
seriously the “basic question, one first posed at the dawn of the Judaeo-Christian
tradition: Are we our brothers' keeper?”42 His answer to that question would seem to be
in the affirmative, but he acknowledges a difficulty in modern democracies, such as the
United States, accepting that burden, because “[t]o do so will often entail costs—in
domestic political support, sovereignty, trade benefits, investment opportunities, tax
revenue and, on occasion, the safety of our soldiers.”43
¶ 23

¶ 24 The preservation of traditional national sovereignty does not loom large for
Professor Cassel, and most of his paper is a description of the development of institutions
and legal doctrines that have led to an undermining of that sovereignty. For him it is now
“clear that gross violations of human rights are not within domestic sovereignty.”44 He
stresses that:

[a]lthough recalcitrant nations even now yelp ‘national
sovereignty’ and ‘domestic jurisdiction’ when called to
international account, their legal argument is no longer credible.
No government believes it, except perhaps the one attempting to
resurrect it as a defense. In international law, human rights have
won the war against exclusive domestic sovereignty. 45
¶ 25 Professor Cassel furnishes an invaluable catalogue of the development of
governmental, non-governmental, and international economic institutions which have
begun to supersede national governments as enforcers of human rights and promulgators
of international “rights consciousness,” and he paints an impressive picture of what has
been accomplished.

In the last two decades, life expectancy in the developing world
rose from fifty- five to sixty- five years. Adult literacy increased
from forty-eight percent to seventy-two percent. Infant mortality
declined from one-hundred-and-ten to sixty- four per one-thousand

40

Id. at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 23.
42
Id. at ¶ 27.
43
Id.
44
Id. at ¶ 49.
45
Id.
41
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live births. Access of rural populations to safe drinking water
increased from thirteen percent to seventy-one percent. 46
¶ 26 For Cassel, however, “the rights revolution still has far to go before its values
of dignity, security, equality and liberty are realized for most people.”47 Among the
difficult question Professor Cassel raises by implication, however, is how does one weigh
the costs of the diminishment of national sovereignty or even national culture that would
be paid to purchase the triumph of individual human rights its advocates seek? Professor
Glendon’s framers of the UDHR would be disinclined to surrender the one to further the
other. Professor Baker may be less sanguine about the superiority of the political
conclusion the U.K. has reached with regard to Human Rights. He explains that:

as a result of activities in Strasbourg, the conception of human
rights in the United Kingdom has undergone a transformation.
They are no longer seen as a set of essentially British ideas, rooted
in history, shared by other civilised nations, and framed into a code
chiefly for the purpose of export to less favoured parts of the
globe. They have become instead a source of ammunition for
overturning domestic judicial precedent and legislation by recourse
to vaguely defined concepts, sometimes interpreted in a
mechanical way without reference to history, and an unlimited
selection of loosely related ideas from around the world. The
obvious danger of this newer movement is not merely
uncertainty—which, paradoxically, is itself inconsistent with the
rule of law—but the increasing politicisation of an unelected
judiciary. Whether that is a fair price to pay for a formal check on
Parliament will be one of the great issues for the United Kingdom
in the present century. 48
¶ 27 Something similar to the question Professor Baker poses might be asked
about the recent possible tendency of the United States Supreme Court, in reviewing and
possibly invalidating the action of state legislatures to look for guidance in what has been
done in the European Community. 49 These, then, are five uniquely informative and
provocative papers, whose highly nuanced character has only been hinted at in this brief
introduction. These five scholars have produced papers which require us really to come
to grips with not only the questions of what are human rights, and what is their likely
future evolution, but, indeed the very purpose of the preservation of such rights. All of
these authors, it would seem, understand (although with varying levels of emphasis) that
human rights are about more than selfish individualism, and that their preservation has
been and ought to be linked with the preservation of community. Indeed, perhaps it does
not go to far to suggest that in these papers one can find something of Oliver Wendell

46

Id. at ¶ 98.
Id. at ¶ 100.
48
Baker, supra note 8, at ¶ 23.
49
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2481, 539 U.S., at ___ (citing the European Convention on Human Rights,
and its application in Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981)).
47
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Holmes, Jr.’s much vaunted “echoes of the infinite,”50 of humankind’s continual striving
for justice, but also of the elusive values such justice seeks to foster.
¶ 28 Perhaps the greatest service rendered by these five papers is to expose the
strong tensions between and among “human rights,” “the rule of law,” and “national
sovereignty.” They lay bare the paradox of our modern conceptions of and striving for
international human rights. This is that what makes the preservation of those purportedly
“universal” rights ultimately worthwhile is the generation of values that may flow as
much from diverse cultures and peoples as from universal conceptions. National
sovereignty is, at some level, essential to produce and maintain those values, but the
institutions of international human rights, as Glendon reminds us, 51 threaten that
sovereignty in a manner that is unprecedented in the modern age.

50

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
“A growing number of scholars have raised their voices against the sort of internationalism that waxes
enthusiastic over the idea of supranational institutions in readiness to over-ride national constitutions and
democratic legislation in the name of human rights. Robert Araujo has argued that an internationalist
program of that type ultimately undermines all human rights, because sovereignty—the exercise of free
self-government by a people—is itself a fundamental human right, one that is essential for the protection of
all the fundamental rights to which it is inextricably linked.” Glendon, supra note 22, at ¶ 34 (citing Robert
Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-Determination: The Meaning of International Law, 24
FORDHAM INT ’L L.J. 1477(2001)). “In a similar vein, Kenneth Minogue contends that the problem with
insufficiently differentiated internationalism is that it aims not only to transcend the nation state but to
over-ride the politics of democratically constituted states. This project, he bluntly states, “cannot . . . be
anything other than a bid for power by a new class of power holders.’” Id. (quoting Kenneth Minogue,
Transnational Interest, A M. OUTLOOK, Spring 2000, at 54). See Stephen B. Presser, “Liberty Under Law”
Under Siege, 45 ORBIS 357 (2001).
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